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Abstract
Based on the experience of the Portuguese and Spanish financial crises in
the early 1990s, this paper suggests that the spillover of exchange rate
crises may reveal a particular dimension of the financial contagion effect:
the presumption of mimetic behaviour by monetary authorities.
This paper analyses the evolution of the credibility of the Escudo and
the Peseta. We set out to test the existence of a contagion effect: that is, in
what way does the polarization of exchange rate expectations in a
scenario of devaluation of one currency explain the building up of a
similar scenario for the other currency? We also examine the transmis-
sion mechanisms of such a scenario.
Our results suggest the existence of a one-way contagion effect, of the
Escudo by the Peseta. Speculative attacks against the Peseta necessarily
give rise to speculative attacks against the Escudo, regardless of the
evolution of the ‘fundamentals’ of the Escudo. In this case, the spillover
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of financial crises could be better understood by the anticipated mimetic
behaviour of monetary authorities, rather than by the geographical
proximity of the countries in question or by the identical performance of
the economies of both.
I. Introduction
The Spanish Peseta joined the EMS exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in
August 1989 and the Portuguese Escudo followed suit in April 1992. Both
currencies participated in the 76% fluctuation band around the central
parity until the widening of the band in August 1993. From the very
beginning and until the general EMS crisis in September 1992, the external
nominal value of both currencies remained stable. Both the Peseta and the
Escudo were among the strongest currencies in the mechanism: they
remained well within the superior half of their fluctuation band, appreciated
relative to their central parities as well as to the Deutschmark. Despite this
past behaviour, both currencies were subject to numerous speculative
attacks, far beyond the general EMS crisis, giving rise to three simultaneous
currency devaluations of the respective central parities between September
1992 and March 1995.
Prior research1 has attempted to find possible reasons for the Portuguese
and Spanish exchange rate crises of the early 1990s. However, to the best of
our knowledge, none of these studies looked for contagion arising from
links between events in the two countries.
There are several explanations as to why crises tend to be bunched or
clustered (Caramazza et al. 2000; Jeanne 1999; Williamson 2000b). A crisis in
one country can spread to others via trade links. Once one country has
devalued, it is costly (in terms of a loss of competitiveness and output) for
other countries, who have strong trade links with the first country to
maintain their parities (Glick and Rose 1999). An original disturbance can
also spread across countries via financial links. Abreu and Scialom (2000)
and Calvo (1996) stress the role of liquidity. A leveraged investor facing
margin calls needs to sell his asset holdings. This leads to other asset prices
being depressed. Goldstein et al. (2000) highlight the role of common
lenders: the need to rebalance the overall risk of a bank’s asset portfolio can
lead to a credit crunch. Another family of contagion models has emphasized
the role of the correlation of fundamentals in the presence of asymmetric
information among investors (Kodres and Pritsker 1998).
1See for instance Bartolini and Prati (1999), Campa and Chang (1998), Kempa and Nelles
(1999), Peria (1999), Favero and Giavazzi (2000) or Go´mez-Puig and Montalvo (1997).
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The Portuguese and Spanish exchange rate events studied in this paper
seem to correspond to another special case of contagion. In this case,
spillover seems to be better explained by the anticipated mimetic behaviour
of the Portuguese monetary authorities vis a` vis the Spanish monetary
authorities, rather than focusing on the geographical proximity of the
countries or on the strong direct trade or financial links existing between
them. We view this phenomenon as a particular case of the escape clause
approach to currency crisis (Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993; Isard 1995;
Sutherland 1995).
The escape clause approach views exchange rate arrangements as
conditional commitment devices. A country which adheres to a fixed
exchanged rate arrangement commits itself to maintain the exchange rate
within a particular band, in view of certain benefits. This commitment is,
however, limited, in the sense that the country’s policy maker may always
have recourse to the escape clause, i.e., if the costs associated with the fixed
peg come to outweigh the benefits of the same. From this perspective, a
currency crisis is a situation in which private agents perceive that monetary
authorities are on the brink of abandoning the prevailing exchange rate
policy.
What would seem to be particular to the Portuguese case is that market
expectations of the monetary authorities’ evaluation of benefits and costs
depend mostly on the likelihood of Spanish monetary authorities abandon-
ing the prevailing exchange rate commitment in response to a speculative
attack. If Spanish authorities respond to an attack with a devaluation of the
Peseta, this will sharply increase the cost of the prevailing exchange rate
policy in Portugal. Investors revise their beliefs on the continuity of the
Portuguese commitment to the exchange rate system insofar as mimetic
behaviour of Portuguese monetary authorities is expected. Speculative
attacks against the Peseta necessarily lead to speculative attacks against the
Escudo, regardless of the evolution of the ‘fundamentals’ of the Escudo.
We evaluate this contagion effect via the econometric estimation of the
expected rate of depreciation of each currency in the band, using
information pertaining to the other country’s financial market as
explanatory variables.
Considering that among European ERM members, interest rates were,
during this period, almost the only effective monetary instrument, we used
the influence of interest rates on the expected rate of depreciation of the
Escudo within the band as a proxy for the effect of monetary policy on
exchange rate expectations.2
2Figure 1 shows exchange rates of the Portuguese Escudo and the Spanish Peseta against the
Deutschmark and the one-month Portuguese and Spanish interest rates.
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Section II briefly presents the parametric tests used to evaluate the
credibility of the exchange rate policy in each country. Section III presents
our own estimations: the expectation of a currency devaluation is measured
here by the interest rate differential, adjusted by the estimated depreciation
expectation of a currency within the band. Conclusions are presented in
Section IV. Our results suggest the existence of a one-way contagion effect,
of the Peseta on the Escudo. The Peseta does not suffer any impact as a
result of fluctuations in the credibility of the Escudo exchange rate. In this
case, the spillover of financial crises can be better understood by the
anticipated mimetic behaviour of monetary authorities rather than by the
geographical proximity of the countries or by an identical performance of
the economies of both countries.
II. Parametric Credibility Tests
We estimated the anticipated rate of devaluation for the Escudo and for the
Peseta using parametric credibility tests in the tradition of Svensson (1991a),
Rose and Svensson (1991) and Bertola and Caballero (1990). It was assumed
that the anticipated total rate of depreciation of a currency is equal to the
interest rate differential, i.e. we accept the hypothesis of uncovered interest
rate parity. In this case, the anticipated devaluation rate in a fluctuation
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band regime equals the difference between the interest rate differential and
the currency’s depreciation within the band. This is a parametric method in
the sense that the anticipated depreciation rate within the band is estimated
rather than computed from the full width of the fluctuation band (as in the
simple credibility tests – Svensson 1991b).
The expected devaluation rate can therefore be defined as follows:
gmt ¼ dmt  Et½Dxtþmjno realignment=m:dt ð1Þ
where:
gt
m is the expected rate of devaluation (at period t) of the central parity m
periods in advance (if it is positive a devaluation is expected); this is equal
to the difference between the interest rate differential and the expected
rate of depreciation within the band;
dmt ¼ imt  imt is the interest rate differential (domestic rate – foreign
rate) at period t, on bonds with maturity m;
xt5 st–ct is the difference between the log of the market exchange rate s
and the log of the bilateral central parity c;
m is the maturity measured in periods and dt is the length of the
period;
Et½Dxtþmjno realignment=m:dt is the expected (at period t) depreciation
rate within the band, between periods t and (t1m), conditional upon
the non-existence of a realignment and Dxtþm ¼ xtþm  xt.
The expected devaluation rate of the domestic currency (Escudo for
Portugal and Peseta for Spain) in relation to the Deutschmark within a
certain time horizon was calculated as the expected domestic rate of
depreciation of the currency within the band, subtracted from the interest
rate differential between each of the Iberian countries and Germany. The
expected depreciation within the band was estimated by OLS using the
following equation:
xtþm  xtð Þ=m:dt ¼
X
j
b0jdj þ b1xt þ b2Dmpte þ b3Dmesp þ etþm ð2Þ
where:
dj: dummy variables, identifying each time period between two
realignments. We therefore allow for (and are able to test) different
anticipated depreciation rates between realignments. If a coefficient is
positive and significant, this means that, on average, the Escudo (Peseta)
was a weak currency within the band during the period between the two
realignments;
xt : as above, is the exchange rate within the band, and is frequently used
as the sole explanatory variable when explaining Dxt1m. The coefficient of
xt, if negative and statistically significant, shows the existence of a force
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pulling the exchange rate towards the central parity, i.e. the deviation of
the exchange rate has a stabilizing effect;
Dmpte and D
m
esp represent the difference between the euro interest rates in
Portugal and Germany (Dmpte) and in Spain and Germany (D
m
esp). The
use of Dmesp allows us to test the influence of the stability of the Peseta
market on the Escudo market.
We wished to estimate the expected depreciation rate within the band,
conditional upon information available at time t for one, three and twelve-
month horizons. Therefore, we consider m.dt equal to 1/12 year, 1/4 year
and 1 year, respectively (this corresponds to m equal to 21, 64 and 254 daily
observations and dt equal to 1/254). As we wished to calculate the expected
depreciation rate within the band conditional upon no realignment between
dates t and t 1 m, therefore, for the 1-month horizon, we excluded from the
sample the last 21 observations prior to each realignment. For the same
reasons, we excluded from the sample 64 (254) observations prior to each
realignment so as to estimate the expected depreciation rate within the band
in the 3-month (12-month) horizon.
Exchange rate depreciation expectations were estimated by OLS.
However, we computed standard errors using a Newey–West covariance
estimator, allowing for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity, since
the dates overlap.
III. Data and Results
A. Data
The credibility of the Escudo exchange rate band in the EMS was empirically
checked through the use of data covering the period from 14 April 1992, one
week before the Escudo joined the European exchange rate mechanism, to 5
March 1995. During this period, the central parity of the Escudo against the
Deutschmark was changed 3 times (involving three devaluations against the
Deutschmark): on 23 November 1992 ( 6%), 14 May 1993 ( 6.5%) and 6
March 1995 ( 3.5%), which was practically the closing date of the series
available to us.
Since the Spanish Peseta joined the exchange rate mechanism before the
Escudo, we considered two series for this currency. One is longer and covers
the whole period of the Peseta’s participation in the ERM from 19 June 1989
to 5 March 1995; the other is shorter and is identical to that of the Escudo, in
order to facilitate comparisons. During this period, the central parity of the
Peseta against the Deutschmark was devalued 4 times: on 17 September 1992
( 5%), 23 November 1992 ( 6%), 14 May 1993 ( 8%) and 6 March 1995
( 7%).
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The credibility tests were carried out using the official central parities of
these currencies in relation to the Deutschmark as the standard reference.
Our choice presupposed the recognition of the role of the Deutschmark as
an anchor for the system. We used ECU spot exchange rates, which were
recorded daily at a mid-morning central bank telephone conference.3 We
therefore deduced the exchange rates of the Portuguese Escudo and the
Peseta in relation to the Deutschmark. These exchange rates were compared
with the official central parities of these currencies vis-a`-vis the Deutsch-
mark, and with a variation range of 76%, in spite of the widening of the
official margins agreed to on 2 August 1993. Such a choice was justified by
the fact that, after this date, the Escudo was kept within an implicit band,
which corresponded to the earlier band of 12% (Abreu 1999a). As far
as the Peseta was concerned, a similar phenomenon was to be noted
until December 1994 (Cassola 1995; Dolado et al. 1992). After the crisis
that occurred in the summer of 1993, the DEM–ESP exchange rate also
seems to have been kept within an implicit band, corresponding to the
ranges of variation authorized before the widening of the bands. However,
from the beginning of December 1994 until the last realignment in March
1995, this exchange rate policy seems to have been abandoned, with the
DEM–ESP parity exceeding the ceiling of 84 Pesetas per Deutschmark4 on a
continuous basis, despite the general increase in interest rates on the
europeseta.
We used daily Portuguese, Spanish and Germany interest rates, for the
period from 14 April 1992 to 5 March 1995. The interest rates used are
annualized bid rates for 1-month, 3-month and 12-month euro-market
deposits, recorded at 10 a.m. Swiss time.
B. Estimations of the Expected Rates of Depreciation Within the
Band5
The influence of monetary policy on expectations as regards the rate of
depreciation of the Escudo
The assessment of the influence of interest rates on the expected rate of
depreciation of the Escudo within the band can be considered as being a
proxy for the effect of monetary policy on exchange rate expectations
3In comparison with the ‘official fixing’ dollar rates, the ecu-rates have the advantage of
being simultaneously recorded for the relevant currencies.
4The ceiling corresponds to the band of variation of 76%.
5We use LIMDEP in our calculations.
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(Svensson 1990; Moutot and Namur 1991).6 An effective Portuguese
interest rate policy will be revealed by a positive b2 coefficient.
Likewise, the influence of Spanish monetary policy on the behaviour of
the Portuguese exchange rate within the band will be revealed by a
significant b3 coefficient.
As far as the influence of interest rate differentials on the expected rate of
depreciation of the Escudo is concerned, results in Table 1 seem rather
disappointing. In fact, b2 and b3 are not significant for the one- and three-
month regressions, and only b3 is significant as regards the one-year
regression. For such a maturity, b3 is, in fact, both negative and statistically
significant, while the Escudo–Deutschmark interest differential is negligible.
The Peseta interest rate therefore seems to play a decisive guiding role, while
the influence of the Escudo interest rate on the formation of expectations
about the depreciation of the Escudo would seem to be negligible, both for
this time period and for the 1- and 3-month horizons. The fact that b3 is
negative suggests that an increase in the interest rate differential between the
Peseta and the Deutschmark led to a reduction of the depreciation rate of
the Escudo within the band. To put it more simply, an increase in Spanish
rates (given German rates) reinforced the Escudo.
How can we interpret this set of results? Two possible explanations can be
given:
1 Portuguese authorities were following the behaviour of their Spanish
counterparts, who were pursuing an effective policy in terms of the
exchange rate objective. While the rise in interest rates in Spain
strengthened the Peseta (and this is confirmed by the negative sign of
the coefficient b3 estimated for the expected rate of depreciation of the
Peseta – Table 2), it also provoked an immediate increase in
Portuguese interest rates, since the Portuguese authorities knew that
otherwise their currency would be subject to an attack. Thus, an
increase in Spanish interest rates would have the effect of restoring the
equilibrium of the Escudo exchange rate within the band. An analysis
of the correlation between the two series of interest rates, as well as a
study of the possible relations of causality between the variations in
6In truth, it is not in fact monetary policy that is at stake here, but rather certain variables
which are directly influenced by this policy and the precise effects on which we do not know.
The use of the euromarket interest rates is not disapproved whenever we assume, as we do
in this paper, that the monetary link takes place through interest rates. In fact, after the
complete liberalization of capital movements in December 1992, domestic and euromarket
interest rates do not differ significantly.
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interest rates, would help to clarify whether mimetic behaviour is likely
to have occurred.
2 Statistical problems plague the results. It is possible to admit that the
effectiveness of the Portuguese monetary policy as well as the Spanish
influence may not always have had the same intensity, nor the same
sign throughout the short period analysed, resulting in the inaccuracy
of the b2 and b3 estimates.
7 On the other hand, it is also possible that
Table 1: Exchange Rate Depreciation within the Band with Interest Rate
Differentials as Independent Variablesw
DEM-PTE
1 month 3 months 1 year
d1:14/04/92 to 22/11/92 0.042 1.916
(0.003) (0.29)
d2:23/11/92 to 12/05/93  7.483  2.633
( 0.44) ( 0.28)
d3:13/05/93 to 05/03/95 11.203 12.814 6.050
(1.74) (2.097) (4.19)
b1  3.798  3.974  1.187
( 2.05) ( 15.54) ( 42.83)
b2  0.752  0.286 0.079
( 0.96) ( 0.58) (0.44)
b3 2.524 0.904  0.724
(1.37) (0.70) ( 4.21)
R-squared 0.27 0.86 0.99
N 669 547 208
Notes: ðxtþm  xtÞ=mdt ¼
P
j b0jdj þ b1xt þ b2Dmpte þ b3Dmesp þ etþm
wOLS on equation (2) with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity. Regressand is (xt1m – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 for one month,
mdt5 64/254 for three months and mdt5 1 for one year (this corresponds to m equal to 21, 64
and 254 daily observations and dt equal to 1/254). dj is a dummy variable for each period between
realignments. The first and second periods for the one year horizon are too short to be estimated.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
7As seen in Section II, in order to estimate the 1-year regression only the observations from
13 May 1993 (the date of the second realignment of the Escudo) to 5 March 1994 (one year
before the third realignment of the Escudo) were kept. This shorter period of time
corresponds to the longest sub period of Iberian exchange rate stability. This could explain
the non-significant b2 and b3 in the one-month and three-month regressions and the
significant b3 in the one-year regression.
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we have strongly correlated regressors due to the interdependent
Iberian interest rates.
An understanding of the influence of interest rate differentials on the
behaviour of the rate of depreciation of the Escudo within the band
therefore requires the continuation of this study along two other tracks. On
the one hand, possible changes in the sign and size of the coefficients b2 and
b3 need to be looked for throughout the period of participation in the EMS.
From this perspective, new estimations were made of the rates of
depreciation of the Escudo and Peseta, either by allowing the coefficients
b2 and b3 to vary between sub-periods or by rearranging the sub-periods
and causing them to coincide with the different phases of credibility of the
Escudo.
Table 2: Exchange Rate Depreciation Within the Band with Interest Rate
Differentials as Independent Variablesw
DEM-ESP
1 month 3 months 1 year
d1:19/06/89 to 16/09/92  5.440  5.968 1.005
( 0.80) ( 1.72) (0.93)
d2:17/09/92 to 22/11/92 24.236
(3.37)
d3:23/11/92 to 12/05/93 3.613 1.857
(0.39) (0.42)
d4:13/05/93 to 05/03/95 18.864 14.754 7.611
(2.87) (5.07) (9.19)
b1  2.976  2.636  0.724
( 2.09) ( 5.18) ( 8.86)
b3  0.660  0.391  0.694
( 0.75) ( 0.52) ( 3.45)
R-squared 0.14 0.41 0.81
N 1376 1221 646
Notes: ðxtþm  xtÞ=mdt ¼
P
j b0jdj þ b1xt þ b3Dmesp þ etþm
wOLS on equation (2) with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity. Regressand is (xt1m – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 for one month,
mdt5 64/254 for three months and mdt5 1 for one year (this corresponds to m equal to 21, 64
and 254 daily observations and dt equal to 1/254). dj is a dummy variable for each period between
realignments. The second period for the three months horizon and the second and third periods
for one year horizon are too short to be estimated.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
Margarida Abreu210
On the other hand, possible relationships of interdependence need to be
highlighted between the evolution of Spanish and Portuguese interest rates.
In this sense, we need to analyse the correlation between the two series of
interest rates and the variation of this correlation throughout the period, as
well as the possible causality relation (in Granger’s sense) between the
interest rate variations in the two countries.
In search of different characteristic periods marking the influence of
interest rate differentials on the behaviour of the Escudo within the band
To test the influence of interest rate differentials on the behaviour of the
Escudo within the band, the rate of depreciation of the Escudo was
estimated for a one-month horizon, for each sub-period between realign-
ments, using equation (3) below:
xtþ21  xtð Þ= 21=254ð Þ ¼ b0 þ b1xt þ b2Dmpte þ b3Dmesp þ etþ21 ð3Þ
Results are presented in Table 3. Two initial statistical conclusions emerge
from these results. First, the instability of the b2 coefficient is evident.
Second, the low model performance for the 14/04/1992–22/11/1992 sub-
period: if one uses the conventional 5% significance level, the explanatory
variables are useless. However, during the other two regimes, that is,
between the first and the third Escudo realignments, the coefficients b2 and
b3 were both negative, suggesting that the increase in Spanish and
Portuguese interest rates strengthened the Escudo within the band.
As far as the Portuguese rates were concerned, the differential with
Germany (b2) was negative, as expected.
8 This minus sign does in fact
confirm the relationship between the interest rate differential and the
exchange rate predicted by the model of target zones, whenever the
exchange rate band is credible: in this case, an increase in the differential
(i.e. an increase in domestic interest rates) strengthens the currency within
the band. In our opinion, the minus sign confirms that the management of
interest rates in Portugal has been largely governed by the objective of
8Given that we have eliminated the observations preceding a realignment over a period that
was shorter than the horizon considered for the estimated depreciation rate, the information
relating to the periods when attacks against the Escudo were not successfully counteracted
by the monetary authorities was also eliminated (otherwise the realignment shouldn’t have
happened). This means that, very probably, we have underestimated the possible existence
of a positive relationship between the interest rate differential in relation to Germany and
the expected Escudo depreciation rate. In other words, we have over-estimated the efficiency
of the interest rate policy. It is therefore normal to obtain a negative b2 coefficient for the full
period, which expresses the fact that a rise in interest rates strengthens the currency, except
in periods of particular tension in the foreign exchange market that precedes a change in
regime.
r Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2003
Contagion Phenomena in Financial Crises 211
exchange rate stabilization and that, most of the time, this policy has proved
to be effective.
As far as the influence of Spanish interest rates on the Escudo is
concerned, the hypothesis that the Peseta has an influence on the Escudo
cannot be rejected, at least for the period from November 1992 to May 1993
and the 10% significance level.
Thus, when taken together, the coefficients b2 and b3 seem to support, for
the one-month time horizon, in the second and third sub-periods, the
results that were obtained with the estimation of the rate of depreciation of
the Escudo for a one-year horizon (Table 1). The credibility of the Escudo
fluctuation band was guaranteed by the rise in Portuguese and Spanish
interest rates. The rise in Spanish rates probably operated (or was perceived
by Portuguese authorities) as a constraint on monetary policy in Portugal.
Nevertheless, we cannot be satisfied with these results. In fact, given the
aforementioned b2 parameter instability and the irrelevance of the first sub-
period regression, we must be somewhat guarded about the conclusions put
forward.
As a result, the question arose as to whether the breakdown into sub-
periods marked by the occurrence of a realignment was in fact the best way
to understand the possible changes in the influences of interest rate
differentials on the depreciation rate of the Escudo. In fact, the realignments
Table 3: Exchange Rate Depreciation Within the Band for Each Period
between Realignments (One Month Horizon)w
DEM-PTE
14/04/92 to 22/11/92 23/11/92 to 12/05/93 13/05/93 to 05/03/95
b0 1.381 25.432 34.930
b1  1.528  1.642  4.919
( 1.61) ( 2.60) ( 14.08)
b2 1.239  1.490  2.240
(1.729) ( 4.618) ( 5.27)
b3  0.217  1.187  1.54
( 0.12) ( 1.68) ( 1.43)
R-squared 0.04 0.29 0.40
N 135 100 441
Notes: ðxtþ21  xtÞ=ð21=254Þ ¼ b0 þ b1xt þ b2Dmpte þ b3Dmesp þ etþ21
wOLS with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
Regressand is (xt121 – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 corresponding to one month.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
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do not seem to mark any significant changes in the evolution of the Escudo
within the band. Using ‘simple’ credibility tests,9 Abreu (1999a) drew
conclusions as regards the relevance of three other sub-periods. The first one,
from the date when the Escudo joined the ERM to August 1992, was
characterized by strong and stable credibility; the second, between September
1992 and July 1993, was marked by a growing nervousness in the markets
(increased volatility), with credibility being restored in leaps and bounds and
only temporarily after each realignment; the third period, between July 1993
and March 1995, was marked by an extreme lack of credibility of the Escudo
band, which was much greater than that of the Peseta.
We therefore re-estimated the depreciation rate of the Escudo and the Peseta
within the band, for all time horizons, in keeping with equation (2), this time
taking into consideration the sub-periods from Abreu (1999a). We also re-
estimated the rate of depreciation of the Escudo, for the time horizon of one
month, separately for each sub-period between realignments, in keeping with
equation (3). The results of these estimations are shown in Tables 4, 5 and 6.
Results in Table 4 show remarkable differences with regard to the
identification of regimes. The coefficient b03 is now significant for all time
horizons, and b02 is significant for the 3-month horizon. On the other hand,
by taking these periods into account, we were able to identify more clearly
the influence that, as a whole, pressures exerted on the Peseta have on the
behaviour of the Escudo within the band. The b3 coefficient for the Escudo is
negative and statistically significant for time horizons of 3 months and one
year. It therefore seems possible to confirm the hypothesis of a contagion
effect of the Peseta on the Escudo for these horizons. The Spanish
authorities increased their interest rates to strengthen the Peseta, an action
in which they were successful (for b3 is also negative for the Peseta, Table 5),
and the Portuguese authorities accompanied them in order to prevent the
Escudo from being attacked, with equal success. Table 6 allows us to
determine the variation, between the different sub-periods, in the influence
of interest rates on the expected Escudo depreciation rate for one month.
The coefficients b2 and b3 are significant for the first two sub-periods.
10
Until August 1992, b2 was negative while b3 was positive. This combination
represents, a priori, a competitive relationship between the two currencies: an
increase in Portuguese interest rates strengthens the Escudo, while Spanish
9In the ‘simple test’, the devaluation expectation is computed by adjusting interest rate
differentials for the maximum and minimum rates of possible currency depreciation within
the band. This method has the advantage of taking into account all the observations, but, on
the other hand, the corresponding test of credibility of the exchange rate band is frequently
inconclusive.
10Considering a 10% significance level.
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rates exert pressure in the opposite direction. A rise in interest rates in the
neighbouring country would expose Portugal to an outflow of capital that
would accentuate the depreciation of the Escudo. Between August 1992 and
July 1993, b2 and b3 were both negative. We therefore find once again the
situation envisaged by the hypothesis of a credible band guaranteed by an
effective monetary policy which closely follows what is happening in Spain.
In the third sub-period, after August 1993, b2 and b3 were not statistically
significant.
Brief assessment of the correlation between Portuguese and Spanish
interest rates and search for causalities
An assessment of the correlation, as well as possible relationships of
causality, between Portuguese and Spanish interest rates, would seem
indispensable for the interpretation of the aforementioned results.
Table 4: Exchange Rate Depreciation Within the Band using a ‘Dummy’ for
Each Regimew
DEM-PTE
1 month 3 months 1 year
d1:14/04/92 to 18/08/92  2.704 8.138
( 0.19) (1.13)
d2:19/08/92 to 08/07/93 11.636 16.669
(0.89) (3.16)
d3:09/07/93 to 05/03/95 23.915 25.103 8.676
(2.16) (5.80) (6.58)
b1  5.124  4.727  1.193
( 2.33) ( 8.12) ( 67.27)
b2  0.867  0.469  0.390
( 1.18) ( 1.10) ( 2.51)
b3 0.160  2.045  0.871
(0.11) ( 2.24) ( 4.70)
R-squared 0.29 0.82 0.96
N 676 547 169
Notes: ðxtþm  xtÞ=mdt ¼
P
j b0jdj þ b1xt þ b2Dmpte þ b3Dmesp þ etþm
wOLS on equation (2) with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity. Regressand is (xt1m – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 for one month,
mdt5 64/254 for three months and mdt5 1 for one year (this corresponds to m equal to about 21,
64 and 254 daily observations and dt equal to 1/254). dj is a dummy variable for each period
between realignments. The first and second periods for one year horizon are too short to be
estimated.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
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By observing the coefficients of correlation between the Portuguese and
Spanish interest rates presented in Table 7, the following may be concluded:
1 That there is an important positive correlation between Portuguese and
Spanish interest rates throughout the whole period of the Escudo’s
participation in the ERM;
2 That this link is stronger whenever the maturity of the rates is longer;
3 That the strength of this link seems to vary greatly throughout the
period of the Escudo’s participation in the ERM. After being very
strong until July 1993, it diminished thereafter, to the point of
becoming negative for time horizons of one month and three months.
The results referred to above attest that there is a strong interdependence11
between Portuguese and Spanish interest rates, and that this actually
Table 5: Exchange Rate Depreciation Within the Band taking a ‘Dummy’
for Each Regimew
DEM-ESP
1 month 3 months 1 year
d1:19/06/89 to 18/08/92  3.636  5.126 0.973
( 0.63) ( 1.26) (0.80)
d2:19/08/92 to 08/07/93 11.43 7.933
(1.34) (1.52)
d3:09/07/93 to 05/03/95 18.708 16.048 7.642
(2.87) (4.82) (8.75)
b1  2.715  2.768  0.730
( 2.19) ( 4.08) ( 6.27)
b3  0.867  0.658  0.692
( 0.93) ( 0.83) ( 3.34)
R-squared 0.12 0.37 0.74
N 1376 1221 607
Notes: ðxtþm  xtÞ=mdt ¼
P
j b0jdj þ b1xt þ b3Dmesp þ etþm
wOLS on equation (2) with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity. Regressand is (xt1m – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 for one month,
mdt5 64/254 for three months and mdt5 1 for one year (this corresponds to m equal to about 21,
64 and 254 daily observations and dt equal to 1/254). dj is a dummy variable for each period
between realignments. The second period for the one year horizon is too short to be estimated.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
11We must bear in mind that correlation coefficients may be biased upward during periods
of high volatility (Forbes and Rigobon 1999), though this may be less of a problem with
interest rates compared to exchange rates or other financial variables.
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Table 6: Exchange Rate Depreciation within the Band for each ‘Regime’
(One Month Horizon)w
DEM-PTE
14/04/92 to 18/08/92 19/08/92 to 08/07/93 09/07/93 to 05/03/95
b0  177.501 38.347 38.115
b1  11.378  1.566  10.120
( 8.16) ( 2.29) ( 23.94)
b2  1.373  1.824  0.251
( 1.72) ( 3.36) ( 0.91)
b3 57.587  2.565  0.099
(14.42) ( 2.97) ( 0.15)
R-squared 0.76 0.23 0.63
N 88 186 402
Notes: ðxtþ21  xtÞ=ð21=254Þ ¼ b0 þ b1xt þ b2D21pte þ b3D21esp þ etþ21
wOLS with Newey–West standard errors allowing for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.
Regressand is (xt121 – xt)/mdt (% a year), with mdt5 21/254 corresponding to one month.
Significant at the 1% level
Significant at the 5% level
Significant at the 10% level
t-stats shown in brackets
Table 7: Pearson Correlation Coefficient between the Portuguese and
Spanish/German Interest Rates on the Euromarket
14/04/92 to
05/03/95
14/04/92 to
08/07/93
09/07/93 to
05/03/95
14/04/92 to
18/08/92
19/08/92 to
08/07/93
Portuguese versus Spanish
1 month 0.469 0.558  0.180 0.178 0.382
(0.033) (0.047) (0.048) (0.106) (0.061)
3 months 0.517 0.625  0.153 0.293 0.456
(0.032) (0.044) (0.048) (0.103) (0.059)
1 year 0.680 0.825 0.256 0.479 0.676
(0.027) (0.032) (0.047) (0.095) (0.049)
Portuguese versus German
1 month 0.650  0.031 0.109  0.072 0.315
(0.028) (0.057) (0.049) (0.109) (0.063)
3 months 0.663 0.018  0.049  0.112 0.351
(0.028) (0.057) (0.049) (0.108) (0.063)
Notes: Interest rates are daily observations on annualized bid rates on euromarket deposits in
escudos and in pesetas. Standard deviations shown in brackets.
Significant at 1%
Significant at 5%
Significant at 10%
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increased after the 1992 crises. This interdependence remained positive until
the widening of the bands in 1993, a period in which both the Peseta and the
Escudo were under pressure. After July 1993, the correlation becomes
negative, in a period when only the Portuguese Escudo was under attack.
The interdependence between Escudo and Peseta interest rates can be
refined by using econometric techniques that look for causal relations. It is
important to stress that the causality established in this way does not
necessarily reflect the underlying existence of a fundamental economic law.
The econometric causality that links two variables together simply indicates
that knowledge of past values of one variable improves prediction (‘cause’)
with regard to the other.
The results of the causality tests applied to the period from 6 April 1992 to
7 March 1995 are shown in Table 8. These results suggest that there is a
relationship of instantaneous causality, in one direction only, from the
Peseta to the Escudo, after the Escudo’s integration into the exchange rate
mechanism. No other relationship of causality can be confirmed, either in
the same direction (but nonetheless considering past values), or in the
opposite direction (from the Escudo to the Peseta).
C. Principal Conclusions on the Rate of Depreciation of the Escudo
within the Band
With regard to the influence exercised by interest rate differentials, and
therefore by monetary policy, on the expected rate of depreciation of the
Table 8: Granger Causality between Portuguese and Spanish Interest Rates
– One Month Horizon
Equationz Equation§ Equationz
Spain c Portugal8
F-stat. 1.715 1.043 1.864
(probability) (0.126) (0.418) (0.046)
Portugal c Spain
F-stat. 3.388 2.531 3.387
(probability) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
wWe use the Sargent’s Tests to evaluate Granger causality. The following equations were estimated:
zYt ¼ a0 þ
Pn
i¼1 aiYti þ et with EðetÞ ¼ 0; Eðet; et1Þ ¼ 0.
§Yt ¼ a0 þ
Pn
i¼1 aiYti þ
Pn1
i¼1 þ biXti þ et with EðetÞ ¼ 0;Eðet ; et1Þ ¼ 0.
zYt ¼ a0 þ
Pn
i¼1 aiYti þ
Pn1
i¼0 þ biXti þ et with EðetÞ ¼ 0; Eðet; et1Þ ¼ 0.
8‘Spain c Portugal’ means that Spanish interest rates Granger-cause Portuguese ones.
Tests have been applied to interest rate monthly average changes between 6/4/92 and 7/3/95.
Interest rates are daily observations on annualized bid rates for 1-month euromarket deposits.
means that the hypothesis of no-causality must be rejected for a 5% significance level.
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Escudo within the band, the principal results obtained allow us to deduce
that the influence of the variation in (Portuguese and Spanish) interest rates
on the position of the Escudo within the band did not have the same sign
throughout the EMS period. In fact, for the time horizon of one month,
results in Tables 1 and 4 show no significant b2 and b3 values, if one
considers these coefficients fixed for the entire EMS period.
For the one-month horizon, statistically significant coefficients of interest
rate differentials were only obtained in the case of separate estimations of
the depreciation rate within each sub-period. Results in Table 6 lead us to
conclude that:
1 From April 1992, when the Escudo joined the ERM until the summer of
1993, Portuguese monetary policy could be regarded as successful (in
relation to the exchange rate objective); the increase in domestic
interest rates making it possible to strengthen the Escudo. In fact, the
b2 coefficient, which expresses the efficiency of monetary policy in
relation to the exchange rate objective, is negative during this period.12
2 During a very short period only (between April and August 1992), the
negative b2 coefficient
13 is linked to a positive b3. This situation would
seem to indicate that during the first months of the Escudo’s
participation in the ERM, monetary policy was effective and not
constrained by the behaviour of the Spanish monetary authorities, with
the relationship between the currencies demonstrating the typical
features of a competitive relationship.
3 Between August 1992 and July 1993, both b2 and b3 are negative and
significant. It would therefore seem that, during this phase, monetary
policy continued to show a tendency to be effective in Portugal (since
the increase in Portuguese rates reduced expectations of a depreciation
of the Escudo), although it was nonetheless largely determined by the
behaviour of the Spanish authorities. A rise in interest rates in Spain
(in view of the strengthening of the Peseta) was quickly followed by
Portuguese authorities, who thus prevented the Escudo from being
attacked. A study of the interdependence between the interest rates of
the two countries seems to support this interpretation. In fact, we
found a strong correlation between the interest rates of the two
countries during this period. Furthermore, the instantaneous causality
noted from the Peseta interest rates to those of the Escudo also seems
to confirm this idea.
12This apparent efficiency of monetary policy does, however, need to be viewed with a
certain amount of reservation, since we have eliminated the observations preceding a
realignment.
13Significant at the 10% level.
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4 In the first two periods, in which the coefficients were seen to be
significant,14 the coefficient associated with Spanish interest rates was
always stronger, which would seem to account for the intensity of the
exchange rate constraint exerted by Spain.
5 After July 1993, it is not possible to make any judgement; either about
the influence of Portuguese interest rates or the influence of Spanish
rates on the behaviour of the Escudo within the band, since neither b2
nor b3 is significant. As far as Portuguese interest rates are concerned,
this fact seems to demonstrate a tendency towards a reduction in the
efficiency of the interest rate policy. In the case of the Spanish
influence, the fact that b3 is not statistically significant confirms that
there was no real symbiosis in the behaviour of the exchange rates of
the two currencies. In this phase, and unlike the earlier ones, the Peseta
was not under attack (the Peseta was simply hovering close to the
band’s ceiling of 6% throughout most of this period); it was the Escudo
that was constantly subject to tensions in the foreign exchange market.
The results for b3 in this period, coupled with the results obtained for
previous periods, seem to suggest the existence of a one-way transfer of
the weakness of the Peseta onto that of the Escudo. The recursive
estimation of b3 (results not shown) seems to confirm this hypothesis,
namely that the influence of the Peseta on the Escudo was exerted at
moments when the Peseta was ‘weak’, and not throughout each sub-
period analysed here.
D. Estimations of the Expected Rate of Devaluation
The expected rate of devaluation of the Escudo and the Peseta in relation to
the Deutschmark is obtained by deducting the expected rate of depreciation
within the band from the interest rate differential on the euromarket
between the currency of the country being considered and that of Germany,
in keeping with equation (1).
On the one hand, the longer the horizon of expectation, the higher the
expected rate of devaluation, which is natural given that a realignment is all
the more likely to occur when the time period considered is longer. On the
other hand, the shorter the horizon of expectation, the higher the volatility
of the expected rate of devaluation, which is explained by the relatively high
volatility of short rates in comparison with long rates.
14At least at the 10% level.
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Let us now focus on the shortest horizon: one month. Figure 2 retraces the
evolution of the expected rate of devaluation (by time unit) of the Escudo
and the Peseta against the Deutschmark for the time horizon of one month.
The estimations chosen for the depreciation rate are those shown in Tables 1
and 2.15
Three sub-periods can be clearly identified.
1 The first of these sub-periods, April to August 1992, is marked by a
weak volatility of the devaluation rate. On the other hand, the
devaluation rate, which is negative throughout the sub-period,
expresses a strong level of credibility in regard to the exchange rate
band. This credibility of the Escudo exchange rate band was only to be
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Figure 2: Expected rate of devaluation for the time horizon of one month
15This choice arises from the fact that the estimation of equation (2) displays better quality
than that centred exclusively on the differential between the exchange rate and the central
parity (xt). Opting for sub-periods between realignments vis-a`-vis ‘regimes’ allows us, first of
all, not to introduce information gaps within each sub-period (which would inevitably
influence the constants associated with each period), for, in order to avoid sudden leaps in
the exchange rate within the band (the depreciation rate is conditionally estimated in the
absence of a realignment), the estimation requires the elimination of ‘m’ observations before
each realignment. Secondly, this choice makes it easier to establish comparisons with the
behaviour of other currencies.
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seen again in a somewhat temporary fashion after the realignment of
May 1993.
2 After August 1992, this state of grace enjoyed by the Escudo came to a
sudden end. During this second sub-period, between August 1992 and
July 1993, phases of credibility followed on from periods when a
realignment was seen as imminent, i.e. phases in which the only
common feature was an enormous volatility of the expected rate of
devaluation. The devaluation of November 1992 brought little more
than a temporary respite, for the rate of devaluation only briefly
remained below zero. After the realignment, the rate of devaluation
shot upwards again, becoming positive after March 1993. Credibility
was once more temporarily restored for a brief two-month period after
the realignment of May 1993.
3 Finally, in the third sub-period, between July 1993 and the realignment
in March 1995, there was an almost continuous expectation of a
devaluation of the Escudo, while, at the same time, its volatility was
reduced. During this long period of roughly 20 months, two crises in
the credibility of the Escudo can be distinguished: the first one in
October 1993, the other in June 1994.
An analysis of Figure 2 allows us to compare the evolution of the expected
rates of devaluation of the Escudo and the Peseta. There are several points
that should be pointed out here:
1 It clearly seems that the credibility of the bands of the two currencies
evolved in a practically concerted fashion following the second
realignment of the Peseta (first of the Escudo) and until the widening
of the bands, in August 1993. Thereafter, their evolutions diverged
quite dramatically.
2 The moments of greatest weakness of the Peseta led almost system-
atically to a realignment of parities, which therefore brought with them
a devaluation of the Escudo. The only exception was the realignment of
September 1992, after which expectations of a devaluation of the
Escudo remained very high.
3 The lack of credibility of the Escudo exchange rate band, which had
increased in the second half of 1993 and continued throughout 1994,
does not seem to have contaminated the credibility of the Peseta. The
realignment of March 1995 only arose after the rapid rise in the
expected rate of devaluation of the Peseta after December 1994 and at a
time when the Escudo seemed to have partly regained some of its lost
credibility.
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IV. Conclusion
The preceding analysis shows that the participation of the Escudo in the
ERM was marked by a repeated lack of credibility after the autumn of
1992. In particular, the 76% Escudo exchange rate band, which had
been implicitly defended by the Portuguese monetary authorities
since August 1993, showed itself to be continuously lacking in
credibility.
There are some fundamental reasons which justify the speculative attacks
suffered by the Portuguese currency in 1992, particularly the over-
appreciation of the Escudo real exchange rate which accumulated from
the second half of the 1980s (Abreu 1999b; Kempa and Nelles 1999;
Williamson 2000a). What is more difficult to understand is why the Escudo
continued to be under pressure until March 1995, once this real over-
appreciation had been absorbed by the first two realignments.
A credible explanation for this behaviour is suggested by the strong link
noted between the Escudo and the Peseta. Yet, as we have seen, this was not
a marriage of the ‘for better or worse’ type. The Escudo seems to have
followed the Peseta when the expected rate of devaluation of the latter
moved upwards, but it did not, however, pull the Peseta down with it in its
moments of ‘weakness’, nor did it benefit from mirroring the Peseta in its
periods of greater vigour. In other words, it seems that the credibility of the
Peseta was not a sufficient condition, but was instead a necessary condition,
for the credibility of the Escudo.
As Eichengreen et al. (1997) have clearly pointed out, we speak of
contagion in foreign exchange markets when there exists a systematic effect
on the probability of a speculative attack which stems from attacks on other
currencies, and is therefore an additional effect above and beyond those of
domestic ‘fundamentals’.
In the Portuguese and Spanish case, this spillover seems to be well
explained by the anticipated mimetic behaviour of the Portuguese monetary
authorities vis a` vis the Spanish monetary authorities. We evaluate this
phenomenon as a particular case of the escape clause approach to new
models of currency crises.
A country which adheres to a fixed exchange rate arrangement makes that
commitment in view of certain benefits. The commitment to maintain the
exchange rate within a band is limited, in the sense that the country’s
policymaker can always exercise the escape clause, i.e. devalue, if the
benefits associated with the fixed peg are outweighed by the costs of the
same. From this perspective, a currency crisis is a situation in which private
agents perceive that monetary authorities are on the brink of abandoning
the prevailing exchange rate policy.
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What would seem to be particular to the Portuguese case is that market
expectations of the monetary authorities’ evaluation of benefits and costs
depend mostly on the behaviour of Spanish monetary authorities in
response to a speculative attack. If Spanish authorities respond to an attack
with a devaluation of the Peseta, it is supposed that this will sharply increase
the cost of the prevailing exchange rate policy in Portugal. A devaluation of
the Peseta thus leads investors to revise their beliefs in the continuity of the
Portuguese commitment to the exchange rate system.
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